Zohaib Ahmed

Syria Reset: The Fall of Assad, the Rise of HTS, and the New Middle Eastern Chessboard

By Zohaib Ahmed | The New World Disorder

For over a decade, Syria has been a geopolitical arena of multidimensional proxy warfare, foreign influence, and ideological conflict. Now, in a significant yet under-discussed shift, the region is quietly witnessing a Syria reset—a recalibration of interests, alignments, and ground realities. And at the heart of this reset lies a central, counterintuitive truth: Israel never wanted Assad gone. It just wanted Iran out.

Israel never wanted Assad gone. They wanted Iran out. Assad wanted to stay in power but not at the cost of becoming a vassal of Tehran. Iran wanted a permanent military corridor through Syria. Russia? Well, Russia wanted to win in Ukraine. When everyone had other priorities, Syria hit the reboot button.


Table of Contents

Prelude to Collapse: The Silent Tectonic Shift

Syria has always been a litmus test for regional geopolitics—where proxy wars, ideological dogfights, and great-power calculations unfold. For over a decade, analysts clung to the narrative of Assad’s survival, bolstered by Russia, entangled with Iran, and contained by Israel. But by December 2024, that model collapsed. Bashar al-Assad was overthrown, not by American bombs or Arab Spring protestors, but by a confluence of regional abandonment, strategic contradictions, and foreign recalculations.

Israel never wanted Assad gone. They wanted Iran out. Assad wanted to stay in power but not at the cost of becoming a vassal of Tehran. Iran wanted a permanent military corridor through Syria. Russia? Well, Russia wanted to win in Ukraine. When everyone had other priorities, Syria hit the reboot button.

Let’s decode this with sober logic, strategic clarity, and a timeline of interlocking interests.


I. The Israeli Dilemma: Regime Change vs. Containment

From the earliest days of the Syrian Civil War, many believed Israel—like the U.S.—wanted regime change in Damascus. But Israel played a different game.

Did Israel want Iran out of Syria? Yes.

Iran’s presence in Syria—especially via Hezbollah and IRGC-linked militias—posed a direct strategic threat to Israeli territory. It enabled Tehran to build a corridor from Iraq to Lebanon, consolidating a “Shiite Crescent” that could threaten Israel with long-range missile systems and asymmetric warfare.

Israel’s red lines were:

  • No precision missile factories in Syria.
  • No IRGC-aligned forces near the Golan Heights.
  • No permanent Iranian entrenchment inside Syrian military structures.

Israel launched hundreds of airstrikes over the years targeting Iranian convoys, depots, and command centers—not Syrian Army units. That’s telling.

Did Israel want Bashar out of Syria? No.

Despite years of demonization in the West, Israel saw Assad as the “devil it knew.” A stable autocrat with a secular regime, limited ambitions, and historically predictable behavior. Assad—even during his worst days—never launched a war on Israel or empowered jihadi proxies along the Golan border.

An unstable, post-Assad Syria risked:

  • A Sunni Islamist takeover by Al-Qaeda factions.
  • Spillover into Jordan and Lebanon.
  • Uncontrolled chaos that could push refugees and extremists toward Israel’s borders.

So, Israel quietly tolerated Assad—on one condition: keep Iran’s hands off the steering wheel.


II. Iran and Assad: A Marriage of Convenience Turned Cold War

It’s often assumed that Iran and Assad were locked in strategic unity. But beneath the surface was a cold, transactional alliance that frayed as soon as Assad regained control over key territories.

Were Bashar and Iran on the same page? No.

Initially, yes. Iran poured in weapons, cash, fighters, and logistics that helped Assad survive the Arab Spring uprising turned jihadist insurgency. But once the tide turned post-2016 (with Russian air support), Assad began to recalibrate.

Did Iran and Assad try to undermine each other? Yes.

As early as 2018, reports from Syrian intelligence circles revealed Assad’s inner circle blocking Iranian-backed recruitment drives in the military and purging IRGC-friendly officers. Assad was also strengthening ties with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, hinting at a future beyond Iran’s shadow.

In response, Iran began entrenching itself via:

  • Militia networks in Deir Ezzor and Al Bukamal.
  • Deep penetration of Syria’s security apparatus.
  • Economic dominance over Syrian telecom and real estate.

Assad resented it. So did his Russian patrons.


III. Russia’s Strategic Exit: Priorities Shift to Ukraine

🇷🇺 Was Russia going to back this intra-axis conflict given its Ukraine priority? No.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 changed everything. Suddenly, Syria became a strategic burden, not an asset. Moscow:

  • Reallocated military resources from Syria to the Donbas front.
  • Quietly gave Israel more airstrike leeway in southern Syria.
  • Urged Assad to de-escalate with Arab states and distance from Iran.

Put bluntly, Putin didn’t want Iran starting a war in Syria while Russia was bleeding in Ukraine.

This led to several observable trends:

  • Russian forces downsizing in key areas.
  • Assad courting normalization with Gulf States (Arab League return, 2023).
  • Reduction in IRGC footprint under local and Russian pressure.

IV. The Syria Reset: Normalization, De-Iranization, and the New Regional Order

So what does this “reset” actually look like in real terms?

The Syrian Reset

The convergence of these factors—Israel’s consistent pressure on Iran, the inherent friction between Assad and Tehran, and the decisive Russian pivot toward Ukraine—culminated in a fundamental Syria reset.

The reported overthrow of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, following a period of reduced Russian support and persistent regional instability, marks the most significant shift in the conflict since Russia’s initial intervention.

This “reset” is characterized by:

  • A blow to Iranian influence: The loss of Assad, a critical ally, disrupts Iran’s regional “Axis of Resistance” and complicates the logistics of supplying Hezbollah.
  • Increased regional power struggles: The vacuum left by Assad’s fall and Russia’s reduced presence has intensified the competition among regional actors, including Turkey and various Syrian factions.
  • A new geopolitical equilibrium: The landscape in Syria is no longer defined by the Assad regime’s struggle for survival, but by a new, volatile power dynamic involving a transitional government and competing external influences.

The current situation in Syria is a testament to the logical consequences of shifting priorities. Russia, facing an existential conflict in Ukraine, could no longer afford the resources or the attention required to prop up an increasingly strained alliance in Syria. This, combined with the enduring conflict of interest between Iran and Assad, created the conditions for a necessary and dramatic geopolitical reconfiguration. The Syria reset is a painful, complex adjustment to a new reality, driven by strategic logic and the unavoidable consequences of war.


The Rise of HTS: From Extremism to Governance

The dramatic collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime in December 2024 and the subsequent rise of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), led by Abu Mohammad al-Joulani (now identified as Ahmed al-Sharaa), has fundamentally reset the geopolitical landscape of Syria. This shift raises critical questions about the country’s future and the reactions of regional and international powers.

The New Syrian Reality: HTS in Power

HTS’s swift ascent to power has forced a reassessment of the group’s intentions and capabilities. Formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra, an official affiliate of Al-Qaeda until 2016, HTS has undergone a remarkable transformation.

Ahmed al-Sharaa has outlined a vision focused on protecting minority rights and establishing a government based on institutions and a council selected by all Syrians. HTS now operates through the civilian arm called the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) and is integrating former regime bureaucrats to maintain administrative continuity.

Sharaa emphasizes a Syria-centric model—calling for the departure of all foreign forces, including those from the US, Russia, Turkey, and Iran.


Winners and Losers: The Strategic Aftermath

Winners:

  • Winners:
    • Turkey: Turkey is widely considered a significant winner. It backed some of the opposition forces, including the Syrian National Army (SNA), and the fall of Assad has given Ankara considerably more maneuverability in Syria. It can now pursue its interests, particularly preventing Kurdish autonomy and facilitating the return of Syrian refugees.
    • Syrian Opposition (specifically Hayat Tahrir al-Sham/Ahmed al-Sharaa): They achieved their primary goal of overthrowing Assad and now lead the interim government. HTS has gained significant power and control over most of Syria.
    • USA: While the US had a complex and often criticized approach to the Syrian conflict, Assad’s fall is seen as a win for curtailing Iranian influence and weakening a Russian ally. The US removed HTS from its foreign terrorist organization list in July 2025 and has re-engaged with the new Syrian leadership.
    • Europe: Similarly to the US, the fall of a dictator allied with Russia and Iran is not regretted. European nations, along with the US, have progressively removed sanctions against Syria (excluding military goods, chemical weapons, and individuals linked to the Assad government) in 2025, which is expected to ease investment. The UK also formally established diplomatic ties in July 2025.
    • Israel: Assad’s fall marks a strategic blow to Iran’s “axis of resistance” and significantly weakens Iran’s ability to supply Hezbollah. Israel views this as a vindication of its actions to weaken Iranian proxies and has continued military operations in Syria, aiming for demilitarization of southern Syria from HTS presence.
    • Gulf States: Countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia, long opposed to Assad and Iranian influence, are cautiously optimistic. They see an opportunity to re-engage with a potentially moderate Sunni-led Damascus.
    • Pakistan: While Pakistan’s involvement in the Syrian conflict was never as direct or as high-profile as other regional and international players, the fall of Assad has created a more favorable regional environment for Islamabad. It reduces internal sectarian pressures, strengthens key alliances, increases diplomatic flexibility, and potentially opens up new economic opportunities in a post-conflict Syria.

Losers:

  • Iran: The fall of Assad is a major strategic defeat for Iran. Syria was Iran’s only close state ally in the Middle East and a critical conduit for supplying weapons and equipment to Hezbollah in Lebanon. This loss severely weakens Iran’s “axis of resistance” and its ability to project power in the Levant. 
  • Russia: Russia was a primary backer of the Assad regime, intervening militarily in 2015 to prop him up. His fall is a significant blow to Russian influence in the region and damages its credibility as a reliable protector of authoritarian allies. While Russia reportedly has an agreement to maintain its military bases, its sway in future negotiations has diminished. The Ukraine war is also cited as a factor in Russia’s inability to rescue Assad.
  • Hezbollah (Lebanon): As a key proxy of Iran and a staunch ally of Assad, Hezbollah has suffered a significant weakening of its strategic depth and a disruption of its supply lines.

Jordan or Yemen? Two Possible Futures for Syria

The Case for Stability (“Jordan Scenario”):

  • HTS’s Pragmatic Shift: The organization has emphasized governance, localism, and minority protection.
  • International Re-engagement: The U.S. has revoked HTS’s terrorist designation, the UK restored diplomatic ties, and the EU has lifted sanctions—signals of cautious international acceptance.

The Case for Fragmentation (“Yemen Scenario”):

  • Internal Divisions: Syria remains a mosaic of factions. HTS’s attempt to centralize military power is facing pushback.
  • Ideological Baggage: HTS’s roots in jihadism still haunt its legitimacy, especially among Western policymakers.
  • Humanitarian Crisis: Infrastructure is devastated. Success depends on reconstruction aid, which remains uncertain.

Israel’s Strategic Dilemma: Cautious Optimism Meets Deep Suspicion

While the fall of Assad was a strategic win in terms of curtailing Iranian power projection, HTS’s rise brings unpredictability. Assad was secular, predictable, and transactional. HTS is untested.

  • Ideological Roots: Al-Sharaa’s ties to Al-Qaeda (however distanced) cannot be ignored.
  • Symbolic Claims: His adoption of the name “Al-Sharaa” (a play on the Golan Heights, or “Joulan”) raises red flags in Tel Aviv.
  • Unknown Future: Israel is wary of HTS consolidating power and then pivoting toward militancy.

Israel has responded by bolstering border defenses and monitoring northern movements but has stopped short of outright confrontation.


U.S. Diplomatic Reversal: From Sanctions to Summitry

Riyadh Breakthrough:

On May 14, 2025, President Donald Trump met with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh—a watershed moment in U.S.-Syria relations.

Key Outcomes:

  • June 30, 2025: Executive Order ends all U.S. Syria sanctions.
  • July 7, 2025: HTS is delisted as a Foreign Terrorist Organization following its formal dissolution and merger into the Syrian transitional government.

Strategic Objectives:

  • Support Stability: Economic reconstruction to reduce refugee flows and re-anchor Syria in regional stability.
  • Counter Extremism: Sharaa was asked to expel Iranian proxies and suppress any ISIS resurgence.
  • Encourage Normalization: Washington hopes this government will lean into peace, not ideology.

Israel’s Dubious Stand: The Unpredictability of HTS

The rapid transformation of the Syrian landscape under the leadership of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, has introduced a complex and unpredictable phase in regional geopolitics. While the previous analysis noted Israel’s satisfaction at the removal of Iran’s primary client, the emergence of HTS presents a new set of challenges that make Israel’s long-term security calculus dubious. Simultaneously, the United States has undergone a dramatic shift in its approach, driven by a desire for regional normalization and reconstruction.

Assad: The “Devil Israel Knew”

For decades, Israel and Assad’s Syria maintained a fragile but predictable deterrence. Despite periods of tension, there were no direct border clashes for decades. Assad, a secular dictator, was focused on internal survival and maintained control over the state apparatus. This predictability was crucial for Israel; it understood Assad’s boundaries and knew that he would generally prevent attacks from Syrian territory unless provoked.

HTS: A New and Unpredictable Threat

The concern for Israel regarding HTS stems from several factors:

  • Ideological Background: HTS, though rebranded, originated from Al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch (Jabhat al-Nusra). While HTS has attempted to distance itself from transnational jihadism and focus on local governance, its ideological roots and the presence of hardline elements raise concerns about potential future aggression toward Israel.
  • Territorial Claims: HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa’s chosen name, “Al-Sharaa,” is a reference to the Golan Heights (known as “Joulan” in Arabic). This symbolic claim to the Israeli-occupied territory foreshadows potential future conflict.
  • Unknown Intentions: Unlike Assad, whose primary goal was survival, HTS’s long-term intentions regarding Israel are untested. Israel remains unsure whether HTS, once consolidated, will maintain a pragmatic approach or revert to a more confrontational stance, potentially leading to increased cross-border violence.

Israel has reacted cautiously, securing the UN-monitored buffer zone on the Syrian side of Mount Hermon and conducting military actions against former Syrian military assets. While the immediate removal of Iranian assets is beneficial, the long-term strategic threat from an unpredictable, Islamist-leaning government on its northern border remains a profound concern.


The Role of the United States: Sanctions Waivers and Diplomatic Shifts

The United States’ role in Syria has undergone a significant transformation following the fall of the Assad regime. The current administration has pivoted from isolation and sanctions toward engagement and reconstruction, recognizing the new political reality.

Sanctions Waivers and the HTS Meeting

A crucial development has been the US’s engagement with HTS and the lifting of key sanctions. On May 14, 2025, US President Donald Trump met with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa (the HTS leader) in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. This historic meeting—the first between a US President and a Syrian leader in decades—marked a dramatic shift in US policy.

Following the meeting, the US government announced a series of measures. On June 30, 2025, President Trump issued an Executive Order terminating the comprehensive US sanctions program targeting Syria. Furthermore, the US State Department officially revoked the designation of HTS as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on July 7, 2025, following the announced dissolution of HTS and its integration into the new Syrian government.

Strategic Implications of US Engagement

The US administration’s decision to waive sanctions and engage with HTS is aimed at several objectives:

  • Supporting Reconstruction and Stability: By lifting sanctions, the US seeks to facilitate Syria’s economic recovery and reconstruction efforts, hoping that a more stable Syria will reduce regional migration and instability.
  • Countering Terrorism and Expelling Foreign Forces: During the meeting, President Trump reportedly emphasized the need for al-Sharaa to expel foreign militants, including Iranian proxies, and assist in preventing the resurgence of ISIS. The US views engagement with the new government as a means to address these security concerns.
  • Promoting Normalization: The US hopes that the new Syrian government will pursue normalization with regional partners, including Israel, potentially aligning with broader US objectives in the Middle East.

The United States’ move to remove HTS from the FTO list and lift sanctions is a calculated gamble. While it provides diplomatic leverage with the new Syrian government and aids reconstruction, it also legitimizes a group with a complex and concerning past.

The Geopolitical Ripple Effect: How the Syrian Reset Weakens Baloch Militancy and Reshapes Regional Alliances

The Syrian reset has triggered ripple effects far beyond the Levant, most notably reshaping support structures for separatist and militant groups across South Asia. The dismantling of the Kurdish secularist network has led to a significant weakening of the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), a separatist group long targeted by Pakistan.

Turkey’s Masterstroke and the Collapse of the PKK-SDF Support Corridor

Turkey has achieved a generational strategic victory:

  • The PKK has disarmed. Its leader Abdullah Ocalan called for the group’s formal disbandment in July 2025.
  • The SDF is being absorbed into the HTS-led Syrian state. Their autonomous Kurdish governance is over.

This collapse of the secular militant corridor—from Eastern Turkey through Syria into Iraq—directly impacts the BLA, which relied ideologically and logistically on this network.

Pakistan’s Strategic Victory

  • BLA’s operational capacity is compromised.
  • Ideological lifeline severed.
  • Pakistan can now suppress insurgency with minimal regional pushback.

U.S. Strikes BLA’s Indian Network

On July 13, 2025, the U.S. shared intelligence confirming:

  • 1,841 Indian nationals identified as BLA affiliates.
  • Visa bans and financial restrictions initiated.
  • Pakistan gains international validation of Indian sponsorship.

This is the final nail in BLA’s foreign support. With HTS in Damascus, PKK disbanded, and Indian handlers exposed, the BLA’s ability to wage insurgency is dying.

The Lesson: Militancy Cannot Defeat the State

The PKK’s 40-year war ended in surrender.

For the BLA, this is the writing on the wall: surrender or perish.

The Syria reset not only redrew borders—it redefined what state power looks like in the post-militant Middle East.


The End of Old Wars, the Start of New Rules

Syria’s transformation is more than a regime change. It’s a generational realignment that shattered entrenched alliances, destabilized insurgent networks, and realigned regional power. HTS’s unlikely rise, Turkey’s precision strikes on Kurdish networks, and America’s strategic U-turn have redrawn the Middle East’s future.

What happens next depends on how long these new balances hold.

But one thing is certain: Assad is gone. Iran is out. The world has moved on—and Syria, reborn through fire, is now the fulcrum of a very different future.

Pakistan’s Strategic Imperative: Engagement with the New Syria

In the wake of these monumental shifts, Pakistan’s role is not merely reactive; it is proactive. The Syrian reset has created a vacuum and a new reality. My analysis dictates that Pakistan must seize this moment.

Pakistan needs to actively build and strengthen ties with the HTS-led government in Syria and assist them in their monumental task of redevelopment. As Pakistan’s Additional Foreign Secretary (Middle East) recently affirmed in June 2025, Islamabad is already engaging with Damascus, signaling its readiness to deepen cooperation across various fields. This is more than diplomacy; it is strategic foresight.

Helping Syria in its reconstruction efforts—from infrastructure to economic revival—is a role tailor-made for Pakistan. It aligns with Pakistan’s long-standing policy of supporting Syria’s sovereignty and stability, and it allows Pakistan to contribute to regional stability and secure its own strategic interests in a post-conflict Syria. This is how Pakistan can further consolidate its gains from the unfolding geopolitical reordering.


Final Thought: A Reset, Not a Resolution

The Syria reset is not a happy ending—it’s a new phase. Assad is gone. Iran is out. Russia is distracted. The West is cautiously returning. But Syria is still broken.

Whether the new HTS-led government under Ahmed al-Sharaa can truly stabilize the nation, earn legitimacy, and integrate into the international system remains an open question. What is certain is this: Syria is no longer the Assad playground, nor the Iranian chessboard. It is now a wildcard—dangerous, uncertain, and pivotal.

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