Zohaib Ahmed

THE RISE OF AGRORISM: US–CHINA RIVALRY AND THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY

By Zohaib Ahmed | 13th November 2025

The Geopolitical Famine: How Deterrence Failure Will Force the Weaponization of Agriculture

Abstract:
The intensifying rivalry between the United States and China is poised to extend beyond traditional military and economic domains into global food systems. This paper examines the emerging phenomenon of “agrorism”, the strategic manipulation of agricultural production, distribution, and trade as a tool of geopolitical leverage. Drawing on current trends in US investments, global food security patterns, and lessons from conflict zones such as Ukraine and sub-Saharan Africa, this study argues that agrorism represents a silent but highly effective form of power projection. The analysis highlights the potential implications for vulnerable populations, the stability of food markets, and long-term geopolitical equilibrium.

Keywords: agrorism; food security; US–China rivalry; agricultural leverage; global governance; conflict.

Executive Summary: A Catastrophic Warning, The Inevitable Pivot to Agrorism

The current trajectory of great power competition between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is rapidly shifting the primary vector of strategic engagement away from conventional military confrontation toward asymmetric economic statecraft. This pivot is not driven by choice, but by strategic necessity, compensating for a critical and growing deficit in the U.S. capacity to sustain kinetic conflict. The emerging high-leverage tool in this new strategic calculus is “Agrorism”, the weaponization of food stability and agricultural systems.

The fundamental geopolitical reality is the growing inadequacy of the U.S. defense industrial base to sustain a protracted, high-intensity conflict with a peer competitor like China. Evidence suggests China’s acquisition rate for high-end weapons systems is five to six times faster than that of the United States, creating a systemic deterrence deficit. This inability to credibly promise military success (Deterrence by Denial) mandates an urgent shift toward imposing unacceptable, existential costs on the adversary’s non-military critical infrastructure (Deterrence by Punishment).   

This analysis identifies China’s structural reliance on food imports, a necessity for feeding nearly 20% of the global population with resource constraints, as its most profound domestic political vulnerability. President Xi Jinping has explicitly characterized compromised food security as a “red line that would trigger terrible consequences” for domestic stability. Therefore, targeting this stability yields the highest possible coercive leverage.   

The United States will not initiate immediate, overt agricultural sabotage. Instead, the trigger for this strategic escalation will be a deliberate, coordinated, multilateral restriction of agricultural exports (primarily grains and feed stocks) linked directly to desired Chinese policy shifts. This action converts the U.S. agricultural surplus into immediate geopolitical pressure.   

The inevitable consequence of this great power competition, waged through food systems, is a global humanitarian catastrophe. Research confirms that food has become a “long-range weapon”. Any disruption to major U.S./China agricultural flows will interact disastrously with pre-existing global fragilities, conflict, economic shocks, and climate extremes. The predictable outcome is the simultaneous economic destabilization of the conflicting parties and the catastrophic famine conditions in vulnerable Global South hotspots (such as Palestine, Sudan, and Haiti), thereby accelerating mass starvation far exceeding the scope of the initial strategic goals. 

Introduction

Food security, defined as reliable access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food, has historically been threatened by conflict, climate crises, and natural disasters. Recent literature demonstrates that armed conflicts exacerbate food insecurity through infrastructure destruction, market disruption, and displacement of populations (Kolishnichenko et al., 2025; Bene et al., 2024). However, a new dimension is emerging: the strategic use of agriculture as a tool of international leverage.

This study explores how US–China competition may trigger agrorism, defined as the deliberate manipulation of agricultural systems to achieve geopolitical objectives. Similar to how pandemics and technological disruptions can create global crises, agrorism threatens to transform food from a basic human right into a calculated instrument of power, potentially destabilizing already fragile systems in conflict zones and developing economies.


US–China Rivalry and Agricultural Leverage

The United States, facing a declining military-industrial edge relative to China, falling export markets, and eroded trust in global governance after its interventions in the Middle East, increasingly views agriculture as a strategic domain. Investments in bioengineered crops, precision agriculture, supply chain infrastructure, and export control mechanisms have intensified, aiming to ensure that food can be used as a tool of influence.

Control over agricultural inputs, seeds, fertilizers, and critical technologies, allows the US to dictate terms to food-importing nations. Nations dependent on these systems become susceptible to price shocks, supply restrictions, or targeted trade measures. Historical examples demonstrate that even minor disruptions can amplify hunger in conflict zones: in Somalia, 43,000 individuals perished due to famine linked to instability, while in Ukraine, deliberate attacks on infrastructure such as the Kakhovka dam amplified shortages (Kolishnichenko et al., 2025). Agrorism magnifies these effects, converting a staple necessity into a lever of power.


Mechanisms of Agrorism

Agrorism operates through multiple pathways:

  • Control of Production: Investments in genetically engineered crops, land acquisition abroad, and precision farming allow manipulation of supply chains.
  • Market Manipulation: Strategic pricing, export quotas, and licensing create artificial scarcity, impacting food-import-dependent regions.
  • Supply Chain Disruption: Targeting logistics, ports, and storage facilities in key regions can restrict access to essential commodities.
  • Technological Dominance: Ownership of agricultural technology and data can influence farming practices globally, creating dependency on US-controlled systems.

The potential consequences are severe: global food prices may spike, malnutrition could increase in fragile regions, and governments dependent on imports may face political instability.


Case Studies and Precedents

The war in Ukraine illustrates how strategic control over agriculture can exacerbate food insecurity. Port closures, destruction of farmland, and halted oilseed processing have threatened millions with acute hunger. Local initiatives like urban gardening have mitigated some shortages, but systemic vulnerabilities remain (Kolishnichenko et al., 2025; Kryvokhizha et al., 2023).

Similarly, African nations facing internal conflicts and droughts are highly sensitive to external agricultural manipulation. Evidence from Burkina Faso and Nigeria shows that disruptions in trade or coercion of farmers reduce output and create long-term insecurity (Bene et al., 2024; George et al., 2021). Agrorism would amplify these dynamics by adding an intentional geopolitical dimension.

The New Strategic Imperative: Erosion of Conventional Deterrence

A. The Critical Deficit in the U.S. Defense Industrial Base

The decision to elevate agricultural stability to the level of a primary strategic weapon is predicated on the measurable deterioration of the U.S. ability to wage and sustain conventional war. The structural weaknesses of the U.S. defense sector create the foundation for the pivot to asymmetric warfare, as the industrial base lacks adequate surge capacity to support a major, protracted conflict.   

In the event of a major regional conflict, particularly one involving the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. use of munitions would rapidly exceed current stockpiles. Under current manufacturing and readiness conditions, the United States could run out of critical long-range, precision-guided munitions in less than one week. Compounding this readiness issue is the speed of peer competition acquisition. China is acquiring high-end weapons systems and equipment at a rate estimated to be five to six times faster than the United States.   

The inability to manufacture and stockpile adequate materiel undermines the central function of military strength: deterrence. If the industrial base is failing, the U.S. cannot credibly promise Deterrence by Denial, convincing the adversary that their military action will fail. Consequently, the U.S. strategic community is forced to increasingly rely on Deterrence by Punishment. This shift mandates the search for non-traditional, high-impact vectors that can impose prohibitive costs on the adversary without relying on kinetic force that the U.S. industrial base cannot sustain.   

B. China’s Precedent in Economic Statecraft

The U.S. pursuit of agricultural leverage is a direct response to China’s successful deployment of economic coercion. Beijing has already demonstrated its willingness and capability to weaponize economic dependencies, thereby setting the rules of the new great power competition. China frequently uses its economic leverage to disrupt markets and compel rivals to acquiesce.   

The most recent and concerning examples involve critical technologies. Beijing has targeted export restrictions on vital minerals, including gallium, germanium, and antimony, which are essential inputs for U.S. semiconductors and batteries. These controls directly impact the U.S. defense industrial base, with export restrictions specifically expanded to target key defense contractors such as Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Raytheon.   

The strategic interpretation of China’s use of critical minerals controls is not merely trade friction but a deliberate attempt to “wield its leverage over the U.S. military supply chain”. This aggressive, asymmetric economic coercion forces the U.S. to identify an equivalent, reciprocal weapon that targets China’s political survival mechanism. Since China’s existential vulnerability is food stability , the logical and strategically compelled countermeasure for the U.S. is to leverage its own massive agricultural export capacity.   

The Mechanics of Agrorism: Defining the Asymmetric Battlefield

Agrorism, in this strategic context, is defined as the covert or overt state application of biological, cyber, or economic coercion to undermine the agricultural stability of an adversary. It is an attractive strategic option because research indicates the capabilities required for a catastrophic attack are “not considerable,” yet the consequences, economic, social, and political, are “substantial”.   

A. Biological Sabotage and the Low Barrier to Entry

Agroterrorism, the deliberate introduction of a disease agent against livestock or into the food chain, is designed to undermine socioeconomic stability and generate fear. The low threshold for entry and the devastating macroeconomic consequences inherently favor asymmetric competition.   

This threat is amplified by advancements in biotechnology. Rapid developments in genetics and genomics are creating “tremendous avenues for the creation of new biological weapons”. These threats move beyond traditional agents like anthrax toward genetically engineered ‘superbugs’, highly lethal and resistant organisms specifically designed for secret operations or sabotage activities. The potential for developing completely novel weapons on the basis of biomedical knowledge is deemed “much more alarming” from an arms-control perspective.   

B. Precursor Activity: Documented Agro-Espionage and IP Theft

The transition from theoretical threat to operational readiness is confirmed by documented cases of agro-espionage linked to foreign adversaries. The United States has charged foreign nationals for conspiracy and smuggling biological materials under the guise of academic research. These materials are not arbitrary; specific pathogens have been targeted. For instance, a Chinese researcher was convicted for smuggling Fusarium graminearum, a fungus explicitly classified in scientific literature as a “potential agroterrorism weapon”.   

These espionage cases demonstrate that adversarial states are already engaged in a bioreconnaissance phase. The collection of specific, dangerous pathogens and critical agricultural intellectual property (IP) is a crucial preparatory step for future state-sponsored biological action. When foreign nationals risk federal charges to acquire particular biological materials, it implies a strategic collection mandate, potentially feeding into talent programs designed to extract U.S. research and technology for adversarial state gain. This elevates the threat from simple intellectual property theft to calculated pre-conflict preparation.   

C. Cyber-Kinetic Warfare on Critical Infrastructure

The operational landscape of modern agriculture is critically dependent on digital networks. From planting and harvesting to processing and distribution, “vast digital networks and cyber-based devices” guide tractors, run processing facilities, and manage supply chains. This connectivity creates an “enormous risk” , providing a highly deniable vector for strategic disruption.   

Cyberattacks can swiftly translate into physical, economic, and political crises. For example, a May 2021 cyberattack on the second largest U.S. meat processing firm forced a three-day closure, disabling 25% of U.S. beef and 20% of pork processing national capacity. This incident demonstrated that a single, non-kinetic strike can cause immediate, substantial market and supply chain disruption. Furthermore, ransomware attacks have severely targeted agricultural cooperatives and grain infrastructure, demanding multi-million dollar ransoms and halting critical operations during time-sensitive seasons. The vulnerability is recognized by federal agencies, who advocate for an interconnected dynamic food supply chain monitoring platform to bolster protection against these threats.   

Mapping the Conflict Vector: China’s Food Security as the Critical Chokepoint

The U.S. strategic pivot is driven by the fact that China’s food stability is its highest political red line. The U.S. trigger for agrorism will be the direct exploitation of China’s structural reliance on imports.

A. The Political Existentialism of China’s Food Security

China faces the monumental and inherent challenge of feeding nearly 20% of the global population while possessing under 10% of the world’s arable land. This challenge is compounded by domestic constraints, including environmental degradation and surging consumption demands from a growing middle class.   

For the CCP, stable food supply is intrinsically linked to social order and regime stability, a lesson repeatedly reinforced by historical famines. Chinese leader Xi Jinping has dedicated significant political capital to this issue, emphasizing that food security is the “top priority” of governing the country. Therefore, any policy that successfully targets this vulnerability yields maximum political return for the United States, effectively bypassing China’s military strengths to attack the foundation of the CCP’s social contract with its citizens.   

China’s stated national policy of “agricultural self-sufficiency”  is understood as a protective measure against this exact strategic vulnerability. The objective of U.S. asymmetric leverage is to undermine the credibility of this self-sufficiency narrative.   

B. The U.S. Trigger: Weaponizing Agricultural Exports

Research clearly indicates that China’s reliance on food imports constitutes a “potential near to mid-term strategic vulnerability” that can be exploited using a carefully calibrated approach. The U.S. leverage is not merely market access; it is the conversion of surplus commodities into political currency.   

The established mechanism of coercion centers on “coordinated, multilateral action” selectively linking agricultural exports, such as U.S. grains and feed stock, to desired shifts in Chinese domestic and foreign policy. This strategy offers “strategic coherence and potential leverage for beneficially shaping interactions with China”. The United States is not selling food; it is selling political stability to the Chinese regime.   

The escalation model for this strategic conflict is projected across three distinct phases:

  1. Phase I (Coercion): The U.S., potentially in conjunction with allies and partners, announces strategic restrictions or phased tariffs on key exports crucial for China’s caloric and animal feed needs (e.g., soybeans, corn).
  2. Phase II (Volatility): This coercive action immediately drives domestic food commodity prices in China skyward, forcing Beijing to deplete strategic reserves and fueling public anxiety. This directly crosses Xi Jinping’s established “red line” of volatility.   
  3. Phase III (Kinetic Agrorism): If China resists coercion, the U.S. escalates by introducing covert sabotage (biological or cyber) aimed at key Chinese distribution nodes or domestic production centers, specifically designed for non-attribution.   

The successful weaponization of the grain market simultaneously cripples China’s access to stable supply and elevates global prices, intensifying the economic pain on nations dependent on China, thereby weakening Beijing’s geopolitical standing.

C. China’s Food Security Chokepoints and Strategic Leverage

China’s structural vulnerabilities determine the points of highest coercion potential:

Table: China’s Food Security Chokepoints

Vulnerability SectorChinese Dependence/Risk FactorU.S. Strategic Coercion PotentialAssociated Risk
Arable Land/Resource BaseHigh population pressure (20% of world population on <10% arable land) Leveraging against resource-intensive imports (e.g., soy) to increase domestic strain and resource competition.Domestic Instability
Food Imports (Grains/Feed)Reliance on stable trade for critical caloric and animal feed needs Coordinated multilateral restriction of key agricultural commodities to influence foreign policy.Supply Shock/Price Volatility
Agricultural Supply ChainVulnerability to maritime disruption and supply chain bottlenecks Targeted intelligence operations to disrupt logistics at critical chokepoints (ports, distribution hubs) to create artificial scarcity.Economic Disruption

V. The Counter-Calculus: US Vulnerability to Retaliation

The strategic appeal of using food as leverage is offset by significant and documented reciprocal U.S. vulnerabilities, creating a scenario of Mutual Assured Economic Disruption (MAED).

A. Critical Input Dependency: The Pesticide Chokepoint

The U.S. agricultural sector is highly exposed due to a critical reliance on foreign, predominantly Chinese, sources for essential production inputs. The United States imports active ingredients for pesticides valued at over $2 billion annually. China provides more than 70% of several critical pesticide ingredients, including the primary components of commonly used compounds like glyphosate.   

This massive geographic concentration and interdependence create bottlenecks that offer “opportunities for foreign adversaries to limit access to these critical ingredients”. China’s most immediate and devastating non-cyber retaliatory move would be an export ban or sabotage targeting these inputs, which would immediately undermine U.S. crop yields for subsequent seasons, crippling the foundational productivity of American agriculture.   

B. Control of U.S. Assets and Intellectual Property Risk

Adversarial control of significant U.S. agricultural assets constitutes a clear national security risk. Think tanks have advised that the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. (CFIUS) must re-evaluate Chinese purchases of major U.S. agricultural entities (including Syngenta and Smithfield) with special consideration for risks involving market consolidation, food security, and threats to proprietary information.   

Furthermore, China’s involvement in seed technology research and development, sometimes leveraging forced labor practices , facilitates the acquisition and theft of crucial agricultural intellectual property. This IP theft undermines future U.S. competitive advantages in developing resilient seed varieties. The vulnerability is not just to current supply but to the future integrity and security of the American agricultural innovation base.   

C. Systemic Cyber Exposure in the U.S. Food Chain

The vast digital connectivity of the U.S. food supply chain makes it an extremely high-value target for sophisticated, state-sponsored cyber retaliation. Vulnerable nodes include critical time-sensitive infrastructure like meat processing plants, fertilizer suppliers, and grain cooperatives. Attacks timed during peak operational windows (e.g., spring planting or autumn harvesting) can inflict maximum loss.   

Coordinated ransomware attacks have successfully shut down grain cooperatives, forcing the loss of administrative functions and halting the supply of essential inputs like seeds and fertilizers. Notably, a single ransomware attack on Iowa’s NEW Cooperative was reported to have impacted approximately 40% of U.S. grain producers. A simultaneous, coordinated attack orchestrated by a peer competitor against multiple, interconnected nodes across the food chain would guarantee nationwide systemic disruption, validating the need for an interconnected, dynamic food supply chain monitoring platform to bolster protection.   

D. Critical U.S. Agricultural Infrastructure Vulnerability Profile

Table: Critical U.S. Agricultural Infrastructure Vulnerability

Vulnerability TypeExample of U.S. ExposureAdversary Leverage PointRisk Level
Input DependencyOver 70% reliance on China for key pesticide active ingredients Export bans or covert production sabotage to cripple U.S. crop yields.High
Cyber AttacksGrain cooperatives, meat processing, farm machinery control systems Coordinated ransomware attacks during time-sensitive operations (planting/harvesting) causing massive production losses.Extremely High
Agro-Espionage/IP TheftSeed technology research and proprietary breeding programs Acquisition of future yield capability; transfer of specialized pathogens and technology for adversarial use.Medium-High

The Unfolding Crisis: Modeling Global System Collapse (The Bill Gates Warning)

The strategic pivot to agrorism, born out of the necessity to find leverage, carries the unacceptable risk of leading directly to a global catastrophe, mirroring the existential urgency of warnings previously issued regarding pandemics. The systemic risk will inevitably spill across borders, affecting the most vulnerable populations with disproportionate and irreversible harm.

A. Scenario 1: Covert Biological Escalation and Systemic Fear

If either the U.S. or China deploys covert agricultural bioterrorism, such as targeted pathogens against staple crops or livestock , the primary goal is not solely yield reduction but generating profound socioeconomic instability and global market fear.   

A critical feature of such warfare is the challenge of attribution. Unambiguous attribution of a lethal biological attack remains exceedingly difficult. This lack of clarity encourages further escalation and retaliation via similarly covert means, fueling prolonged cycles of suspicion and economic uncertainty that far outlast the initial event. A single, successful, and deniable strike against a key commodity market (e.g., U.S. wheat or a major Chinese grain) would immediately trigger global market panic, halting international trade flows due to widespread fear of contamination, regardless of the pathogen’s actual spread.   

B. Scenario 2: Economic Coercion and Import Shock Contagion

A direct U.S. restriction on agricultural exports  triggers immediate price spikes and food shortages within China, but the consequences rapidly spread globally due to the interconnectedness of food systems. Research demonstrates that geopolitical conflict, when coupled with environmental or weather extremes, ensures devastating global production losses across multiple markets. Since the U.S. and China are two of the largest food exporters and importers, their strategic conflict destabilizes the entire global pricing and supply infrastructure.   

Food has become a “long-range weapon”. The catastrophic collateral damage falls inevitably upon regions already suffering from acute food insecurity caused by conflict, economic shocks, and climate change. Acute food insecurity is already deepening in 16 global hotspots, including those facing imminent risk of catastrophic hunger (e.g., Palestine, Sudan, South Sudan, Yemen, and Haiti).   

This global system is already at a breaking point. Humanitarian funding is perilously limited, with severe shortfalls crippling emergency responses and forcing deep ration cuts. A US-China agro-war, by increasing global food prices and reducing available supply, acts as a force multiplier, ensuring that millions in these vulnerable regions are pushed into widespread starvation and famine because aid agencies cannot compete with global market prices to secure food. Without urgent financing, vital livelihood support, such as seeds and livestock health services, will not reach communities, eroding resilience and heightening the risk of future crises.   

C. The True Danger: Erosion of Global Food Governance

The most devastating long-term consequence of this strategic path is the collapse of international norms surrounding food trade. International law explicitly prohibits the weaponization of food. If major global powers, driven by conventional deterrence failure, choose to explicitly weaponize staple commodities for strategic leverage, it sets a global precedent. This disregard for norms encourages international hoarding, destroys long-term trade trust, and undermines multilateral efforts aimed at stabilization (such as the Black Sea Grain Initiative ).   

The strategic competition will metastasize into a permanent global hunger crisis, as nations dependent on food imports will be forced to pursue costly and inefficient measures toward immediate, total self-sufficiency, fracturing the global supply chain and ensuring long-term price volatility.

Conclusions and Strategic Recommendations

Implications for Global Food Security

The rise of agrorism carries several implications:

  • Vulnerability of Developing Nations: Countries heavily dependent on imports or foreign technologies may become pawns in geopolitical maneuvering.
  • Conflict Escalation: Food shortages could exacerbate internal instability, triggering migration, civil unrest, and potential conflicts.
  • Policy Challenges: Traditional food aid and humanitarian interventions may be insufficient if production and supply chains are deliberately targeted.
  • Ethical and Legal Concerns: Weaponization of food violates international norms and could constitute a modern form of economic coercion.

The transition toward agricultural vulnerability as a primary geopolitical pressure point is unavoidable given the current trajectory of conventional military imbalance. To navigate this new era of Agrorism and mitigate the guaranteed global humanitarian catastrophe, immediate and systemic policy changes are required.

A. Domestic Resilience and Supply Chain Autonomy

  1. Harden Critical Infrastructure: The federal government must prioritize funding and implementation of the interconnected, dynamic food supply chain monitoring platform recommended by the USDA, focusing on hardening critical agricultural infrastructure against systemic cyber attacks.   
  2. Reduce Input Dependencies: Policies must be enacted to immediately reshore the production and processing of essential agricultural inputs, particularly the active ingredients for pesticides, where U.S. reliance on Chinese sources currently exceeds 70%. This action is essential to remove China’s most immediate retaliatory counter-leverage.   

B. Deterrence Through Attribution and Retaliation Policy

  1. Establish Clear Red Lines: The U.S. must finalize and implement the USDA’s National Farm Security Action Plan to its full extent.   
  2. Ensure Ownership Security: Legislation must be enacted at federal and state levels to restrict foreign adversaries from controlling American farmland. Furthermore, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. (CFIUS) must be empowered and mandated to re-review all Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) purchases of agricultural assets (including Syngenta and Smithfield) to mitigate market consolidation and proprietary information risks.   
  3. Develop Attribution Capabilities: Investment must be dedicated to developing unambiguous attribution capabilities for biological and sophisticated cyber attacks targeting the agricultural sector to restore the credibility of Deterrence by Punishment against covert state action.   

C. International Stability and Humanitarian Mitigation

  1. Bolster Global Food Governance: The U.S. must strategically prioritize strengthening international food security frameworks, including multilateral support for organizations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP). This is essential to create a humanitarian buffer that can absorb the inevitable volatility created by the US-China strategic conflict, preventing a catastrophic humanitarian disaster that would only further destabilize the geopolitical environment.   
  2. Support Livelihood Resilience: Urgent financing must be directed toward protecting agricultural livelihoods in vulnerable countries, ensuring that seeds, livestock health services, and anticipatory agricultural action are delivered before planting seasons begin or new shocks occur, reducing dependence on emergency aid.   

Policy Recommendations

To counter agrorism, global and local actors must adopt proactive strategies:

  • Resilient Local Food Systems: Promoting urban agriculture, community-led initiatives, and diversified crop portfolios reduces dependency on external suppliers.
  • International Coordination: Strengthening legal frameworks against the use of food as a weapon, monitoring trade flows, and reinforcing global governance structures.
  • Technological Sovereignty: Supporting local capacity for agricultural research, storage, and supply chain management to minimize foreign leverage.
  • Data-Driven Early Warning Systems: Monitoring production, prices, and geopolitical signals to anticipate potential agrorism interventions.

Conclusion

Agrorism represents a new frontier in the US–China rivalry, combining traditional geopolitics with the vulnerability of food systems. Just as pandemics can silently devastate societies, the weaponization of agriculture has the potential to create slow-burning crises with far-reaching consequences. To protect populations and global stability, policymakers must prioritize resilience, local capacity, and ethical governance in agriculture. Failure to do so risks not just hunger, but a decade-long intensification of geopolitical coercion through the food we depend on every day.

Sources:

features.csis.org

The U.S. Industrial Base Is Not Prepared for a Possible Conflict with …

csis.org

China’s Food Security: Key Challenges and Emerging Policy Responses – CSIS

chinapower.csis.org

How Severe Are China’s Food Security Challenges? – ChinaPower Project

airuniversity.af.edu

Dragons Must Eat: China’s Food Insecurity and Strategic Vulnerability – Air University

securityconference.org

Turning Dependency Into Despair: Methods of Using Food as Long-Range Weapon

wfp.org

New FAO-WFP report warns of shrinking window to prevent millions more people facing acute food insecurity in 16 hotspots

pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov

On the coincidence of weather extremes and geopolitical conflicts: Risk analysis in regional food markets – PubMed Central

armyupress.army.mil

Economic Warfare China’s Financial Alternative to Military Reunification with Taiwan

compete.org

Nationally Coordinated Innovation: America’s Answer to China, Inc. – Compete

theguardian.com

China says it will ‘fight to end’ after US said it was trying to hurt world economy | Trump tariffs

rand.org

Agroterrorism: What Is the Threat and What Can Be Done About It? | RAND

 

pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov

Genetic engineering and biological weapons – PMC – PubMed Central – NIH

michiganfarmnews.com

‘A threat to our collective security’, three more Chinese researchers charged at U of M

washingtonexaminer.com

Chinese scientist to be deported after pleading guilty in fungus smuggling case

ndupress.ndu.edu

Weaponizing Wheat: How Strategic Competition With Russia Could Threaten American Food Security – NDU Press

itif.org

From Outside Assaults to Insider Threats: Chinese Economic Espionage | ITIF

twin-cities.umn.edu

The risk of cyber attacks on the food and agriculture supply chain | University of Minnesota

dni.gov

Fortifying the Agri-Food Supply Chain Counterintelligence Risks

ams.usda.gov

GIAC Cyber Security Discussion Paper | Agricultural Marketing Service

nonproliferation.org

Biological Terrorism Targeted at Agriculture: The Threat to US National Security – James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

openknowledge.fao.org

3.3 The impact of armed conflict on agriculture – FAO Knowledge Repository

americafirstpolicy.com

China-Dominated U.S. Agricultural Sectors Are a National Security Threat | Research Report

ams.usda.gov

Promoting Fair Competition and Innovation in Seeds and Other Agricultural Input Industries

ncuscr.org

The Fight for Food Security: U.S.-China & the World – NCUSCR

Leave a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *