By Zohaib Ahmed | 29th September 2025
For more than four decades, Pakistan has shouldered one of the world’s largest refugee burdens. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, wave after wave of Afghans have sought shelter across the border. At its peak, Pakistan hosted millions with few restrictions, allowing them to live, work, and establish businesses. This hospitality, however, has morphed into a crisis of economics, security, and national identity, one that Islamabad can no longer afford to ignore.
The Currency Drain
According to officials, a significant portion of Pakistan’s circulating rupee ends up in Afghan networks, only to be converted into U.S. dollars and transferred back to Afghanistan. This informal cycle has become one of the biggest pressures on Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves and a direct contributor to the rupee’s depreciation. Dollar smuggling across the border follows the same pattern: Afghans purchase goods in Afghanis, sell them inside Pakistan for rupees, and then convert those rupees into dollars for transfer back to Kabul.
The Taliban, denied nearly $9 billion in frozen central bank reserves after their August 2021 takeover, have relied heavily on such inflows. Combined with strict currency controls, these illicit transfers have allowed the Afghan afghani to remain surprisingly stable against the dollar, even as the Pakistani rupee sinks. In effect, Afghanistan’s financial stability has been underwritten by Pakistan’s economic bleeding.
The Refugee Burden
Today, Pakistan hosts an estimated 3–4 million Afghans, both registered and unregistered. Around 1.35 million hold Proof of Registration cards, but millions more remain undocumented, including many who entered after 2021. While Afghan groups often claim exaggerated figures of 8–10 million, the real numbers are already daunting enough.
Over the decades, Afghans acquired property, plazas, and entire markets inside Pakistan, with many Pakistanis working as their employees. At the same time, the misuse of Pakistani identity documents has become a national scandal. For years, the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) illegally issued thousands of CNICs to Afghans. Since 2023, more than 18,000 such IDs have been canceled in a military-backed campaign, with security agencies directly involved in cleaning the system.
Islamabad’s patience snapped in October 2023 with the launch of the Illegal Foreigners’ Repatriation Plan. The government declared undocumented Afghans a national security threat, blocked fake IDs, and began deportations. Hundreds of thousands have since returned, but millions remain.
The Security Question
Beyond economics, the Afghan file is also a matter of life and death for Pakistan. Terror groups like the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), ISIS-K, and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) continue to use Afghan soil as sanctuaries. The sharp resurgence of terrorism since 2021 has been traced back to these safe havens, souring Pakistan-Afghanistan ties to breaking point.
Islamabad accuses Kabul of using these groups as bargaining chips, allowing them to operate as leverage in negotiations. At the same time, Afghan refugees in Pakistan are increasingly viewed with suspicion—not only for their alleged links to militancy but also for their active involvement in anti-state propaganda and, at minimum, deep resentment toward the country that has hosted them for decades.
Afghanistan and the New Great Game
Afghanistan has never truly been a “player” in the Great Game—it has always been the ground on which the contest is fought. In the emerging order, Kabul sits at the intersection of four competing files: Tehran, Moscow, Beijing, and Islamabad.
For Tehran, covert and overt footprints in western Afghanistan are already established. Moscow, by contrast, seeks ingress into Afghanistan from the northwest—something absent in earlier episodes of the Great Game. But the more complex dimension lies in the Islamabad-Beijing file. Are Pakistan and China separate players in Kabul, or an interconnected front?
The answer matters because of CPEC. What the Kabul-Peshawar corridor offers is not just trade routes but an intelligence vantage point—an ISR collection platform over China-Pakistan Economic Corridor nodes. That explains why the U.S. has consistently blocked the UN Security Council’s terror listing of the BLA, despite designating it a terrorist group itself. The BLA’s primary mission has been to disrupt CPEC, targeting Chinese personnel, infrastructure, and investment inside Pakistan. Washington could, at any time, reverse course and allow BLA’s listing, framing it as a non-aggressive gesture while quietly shifting the battlefield elsewhere.
During his first tenure, Donald Trump authorized the CIA to create a dedicated unit targeting China’s Belt and Road Initiative. CPEC, as the flagship project, was an explicit target. Meanwhile, Trump’s approach toward Russia was instructive: rather than risk direct escalation, Washington sought to undercut Moscow’s global and regional footprint through sanctions and containment—an approach mirrored today in U.S. policy toward China.
In this evolving “war gaming,” Pakistan has struggled to assert its own narrative. After the U.S. withdrawal in 2021, Islamabad attempted to reposition itself by focusing on the TTP and cross-border terrorism. But Washington’s renewed maneuvering has denied Pakistan narrative dominance. Today, whenever Islamabad takes a hard line against Kabul, it risks being framed not as acting in its own interest but as merely extending the pre-withdrawal American agenda—a trap that underscores just how narrow Pakistan’s room for maneuver has become.
A Costly Hospitality
For years, Pakistan stood almost alone in granting Afghans open-ended residence, work, and business rights. Few countries in the world would allow millions of foreigners to buy property, dominate sectors of commerce, and circulate freely with minimal restrictions. That leniency has come at a steep cost. It has strained local resources, fueled the informal economy, and created enduring social and political friction.
Today, Pakistan is attempting a difficult course correction. It is tightening borders, canceling illegal IDs, and forcing undocumented Afghans to leave. But the damage runs deep. Dollar smuggling, terror sanctuaries, property takeovers, and decades of unchecked migration have left scars that will take years to heal.
The Road Ahead
Islamabad’s challenge is twofold: to secure its economy and borders while managing the humanitarian dimensions of repatriation. Yet the mood in the country is shifting. Where Afghans were once seen as victims of war deserving shelter, they are increasingly viewed as participants—whether willingly or by circumstance—in Pakistan’s economic decline and security crises.
Afghanistan may never have been a player in the Great Game, but Pakistan today finds itself one of its reluctant pawns—caught between the imperatives of sovereignty, security, and survival in a neighborhood where every move is part of someone else’s strategy.
Recommendations
As I step back from the immediate crises—currency drain, refugee burden, and cross-border militancy—I see Pakistan’s Afghan dilemma through three strategic prisms: power, perception, and security.
First, we must recognize, as any realist would, that Afghanistan has never been a “player” but always the “ground” of the Great Game. Our strategy cannot be reactive. Pakistan needs to position itself as a balancer, not merely a frontline state. That means broadening our diplomatic bandwidth: working with Moscow on energy corridors, keeping Tehran close enough to prevent isolation, and deepening but not over-relying on Beijing. Strategic depth in the 21st century is not about physical space—it is about diversified alliances and economic resilience.
Second, optics matter. Internationally, Pakistan is often seen as an actor without narrative control, cast either as an American proxy or a crisis-ridden state. We must reclaim the narrative. That requires transparency in our economic reforms, a hard but humane line on undocumented migrants, and a clear articulation of how Afghan currency smuggling directly undermines our sovereign stability. In the age of global finance and instantaneous news cycles, shaping perception is as critical as securing territory.
Third, we must treat security not only as a military challenge but as an intelligence ecosystem. The TTP, ISIS-K, and BLA operate in gray zones that demand pre-emptive intelligence dominance rather than reactionary strikes. Pakistan’s internal security apparatus needs restructuring on modern lines: greater data integration across agencies, more investment in cyber-ISR capabilities, and a tighter alignment of domestic policing with border surveillance. A stronger intelligence posture would not only disrupt militant sanctuaries but also deny hostile actors—whether in Kabul or elsewhere—the ability to frame our moves as extensions of foreign agendas.
In simple terms, the path forward for Pakistan is not to fight everyone everywhere, but to re-anchor itself in three essentials: economic sovereignty, narrative control, and intelligence superiority. If we get these right, Afghanistan will remain what it has always been—ground for the Great Game—but this time, Pakistan won’t just be a pawn moving at someone else’s command.
Controlling the Economic Bleed
If I look at Pakistan’s Afghan dilemma, the lesson is blunt: economics is the battlefield, and currency is the weapon. To regain control, Pakistan must shut down the informal trade pipelines that allow Afghan networks to siphon our rupee and convert it into dollars. This requires more than border checks—it needs systemic economic restructuring. We must bring undocumented Afghan businesses into the tax net, restrict the outflow of dollars through hawala and hundi, and leverage regional banking mechanisms that cut Afghanistan’s dependence on our reserves. The truth is, Afghanistan has no functioning economic infrastructure without Pakistan. That dependency is our leverage. The moment we institutionalize trade only through formal banking channels, we turn what is now an economic liability into a controlled relationship, where Pakistan—not black markets—dictates the rules.
Fixing the Hate Narrative
But economics alone won’t cure the deeper infection—the Afghan hate narrative against Pakistan. Perception management is as important as pipelines. For too long, Afghans have been allowed to live in Pakistan while simultaneously cultivating anti-Pakistan sentiment, often amplified by Kabul’s power brokers. To reverse this, Pakistan must blend firmness with selective engagement. Deport undocumented Afghans firmly, but for those legally staying, tie their access to education, healthcare, and business rights with a condition: no anti-state activity, no propaganda. Alongside this, launch targeted cultural diplomacy campaigns—student exchange programs, joint media initiatives, and regional trade fairs—that reframe Pakistan not as the enemy but as the enabler of Afghanistan’s survival. Hate thrives in economic desperation and political manipulation; weaken those, and the narrative begins to shift.